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Summary
The purpose of this study is to assess the results
of the Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover Program in
Indonesia. In 1987, the Government of Indonesia
adopted a policy to turn over to water user
associations (WUAs) the management of all public
irrigation systems—from the intake to drainage
facilities—in the country, which are 500 hectares or
less in service area. The primary interest of the
government in the turnover policy is to lighten its
cost burden for the irrigation subsector while
enabling farmers to sustain and even improve the
productivity of irrigated agriculture through the
mobilization of their own local resources. Generally
speaking, the primary concern of farmers (in a
context where there is no volumetric water charge)
is to maintain or increase the returns per unit of
land and labor.
This report examines to what extent these
aspirations of the government and the farmers
were realized through the turnover program. The
report analyzes the impacts of management
turnover on irrigation management and irrigated
agriculture in selected small-scale systems in
West and Central Java. Impacts measured include
costs of irrigation to the government and the
farmers, quality of irrigation operations and
maintenance, agricultural productivity, financial and
economic viability of irrigation systems, and social
implications of management turnover. The key
research questions are: “To what extent has the
turnover of irrigation systems from the government
to the farmers directly affected irrigation system
management?” and, more broadly, “To what extent
has irrigation system turnover had an impact on
the performance of irrigated agriculture?”
This study is part of a comparative research
program to examine the impacts of irrigation
management transfer in several countries using a
common methodology (Vermillion et al. 1996). The
International Water Management Institute and
Gadja Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia
collaborated in this study.
The Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover Program
has led to modest efforts by farmers to improve
management efficiency and responsiveness.
Turnover has not increased the costs of irrigation
to farmers (at least in the short run). Water
distribution in the four case study systems tended
to either improve or remain positive after turnover.
However, it is apparent that significant future
expenditures loom in the future unless the current
observed underinvestment in maintenance by
farmers is halted. No significant changes were
observed in agricultural performance or in the
economic returns per unit of land and water. The
modest outcomes and lack of significant impacts
of the program can be explained by the high levels
of agricultural production already achieved and the
modest and partial nature of the reforms in Java.
The study recommends comprehensive, radical
reform of irrigation management, since a series of
modest efforts at improvement has not proven
effective in improving performance or ensuring
financial and physical sustainability of irrigation.
Regional Indonesian irrigation services should be
restructured towards a support service, with a
regulatory and water basin focus, with financing
coming increasingly from payments for services
delivered rather than from government allocations.
The threat of deterioration can be overcome by
replacing periodic rehabilitation with ongoing
incremental infrastructure improvements jointly
financed by the government and the farmers.
WUAs should be granted clear water rights, the
freedom to federate to the system level, control
over infrastructure improvement and the right to
admit nonirrigator water users as members. The
turnover process should include farmer
representatives in the organizing process as well
as enhanced monitoring and evaluation. Where
needed as part of turnover, rehabilitation should
follow rather than precede the formation of the
WUAs.1
Introduction
Purpose of the Study
In 1987, the Government of Indonesia adopted a
policy to transfer the management of all public
irrigation systems in the country that are 500
hectares or less in service area to WUAs. These
systems constitute about 21 percent of the total
design area and 70 percent of irrigation systems
in the public sector. The primary interest of the
government in the turnover policy is to lighten the
cost burden to the government for the irrigation
subsector while enabling farmers to sustain and
even improve the productivity of irrigated
agriculture through the mobilization of their own
local resources. The primary concern of farmers
(in a context where there is no volumetric water
charge) is to maintain or increase the returns per
unit of land and labor.
This study examines the extent to which the
aspirations of the government and farmers were
realized through the turnover program. The report
deals with management turnover in the context of
small-scale irrigation systems in Indonesia, and
relates this to impacts on irrigation management
and irrigated agriculture in selected systems in
West and Central Java. Impacts measured include
costs of irrigation to the government and farmers,
quality of irrigation operations and maintenance
(O&M), agricultural productivity, financial and
economic viability of irrigation systems, and social
implications of management turnover. The key
research questions are, “To what extent has the
turnover of irrigation systems from the government
to farmers directly affected irrigation system
management?” and, more broadly, “To what extent
has irrigation system turnover had an impact on
the performance of irrigated agriculture?”
Although irrigation management transfer (IMT)
is now a policy in many developing countries, at
present there is a shortage of comparative
evidence at the international level to answer these
questions (Vermillion 1997). This is part of a
comparative research program of the International
Water Management Institute (IWMI) that examines
the impacts of IMT in several countries, using a
common methodology (Vermillion et al. 1996).
IWMI and the Gadja Mada University in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia collaborated in this study.
Study Methodology
This case study is part of a larger research
program assessing the impacts of irrigation
management transfer in different countries,
including Colombia, India, Indonesia and Sri
Lanka.
1 It documents basic information on the
turnover policy and on the program and
implementation process at the national and
operational levels.
Observed results of turnover can be divided
into outcomes and impacts. By outcomes we
mean the direct effects of turnover on irrigation
management. These include practices and
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1See Samad and Vermillion 1999; IIMA and IWMI 1999; Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo 1998.2
achievements in operations, maintenance,
financing, disputes and staff disposition. Pertinent
outcome indicatorsinclude relative irrigation supply,
irrigation intensity, functional condition of
infrastructure, cost of irrigation, ratio between cost
of repairing damaged structures to average annual
maintenance expenditures, financial solvency of
irrigation organizations, frequency of water
disputes and average service area of management
staff. Impacts are the longer-term effects of
turnover on the performance of irrigated agriculture
and the relation between costs and benefits of
irrigation to farm families. They include such
indicators as cropping intensity, crop yield, and
gross value of agricultural output per unit of land
and water.  Data collection and analysis were
based on five key hypotheses about the relation
between irrigation management turnover and
outcomes and impacts. These are listed as
follows:
1. Irrigation management transfer will induce
changes in system management practices
that will improve management efficiency and
responsiveness to farmer irrigation
requirements.
2. Management transfer will bring about
improvements in the quality of irrigation
operations and maintenance, and will result in
sustainable infrastructure maintenance.
3. Other agronomic factors being more or less
equal, turnover will be followed by a
discernible improvement in agricultural
productivity of irrigated agriculture.
4. Management transfer will increase the cost of
irrigation to farmers.
5. Other economic factors being more or less
equal, turnover will be followed by an
improvement in the economic returns per unit
of land and water.
The study employed two kinds of comparisons
of differences in performance:
 before and after turnover (for the four selected
systems in West and Central Java), and
 with and without turnover (for comparing
performance according to a small set of
indicators for a larger set of systems in both
provinces).
Four systems were selected for intensive
analysis: Cipanumbangan and Cinangka II
irrigation systems in West Java and Kaliduren and
Planditan systems in Central Java (figure 1).
These systems were selected because of their
larger-than-average service areas and because
they are amongst the earliest systems to be
transferred. The longer post-turnover period would
provide better insight into outcomes and impacts.
In the early part of the transfer program, systems
selected by the government for turnover tended to
be the smaller ones. The selection of the larger
systems available from this early cohort for this
study was done so that these systems would
represent more typical systems that would be
turned over eventually. Table 1 gives basic data
on the selected systems and annex 1 gives
further information about the systems.
Data were collected from key informants
among farmers and irrigation agency staff, from
walk-through inspections of irrigation networks,
from discussions among farmers, from a formal
survey questionnaire for farmers and from
secondary data kept by the Departments of
Irrigation and Agriculture. Informant interviews
were primarily used to obtain qualitative and
historical information about the turnover process
and management context and about changes that
were made in management practices as a result
of turnover.
The walk-through inspections were used to
obtain data on the functional condition of the
irrigation network and the cost of repairing3
TABLE 1.
Basic data of irrigation systems selected for the study.
Planditan Kaliduren Cipanumbangan Cinangka II
Province Central Java Central Java West Java West Java
Year built 1918 1918 1970 1980
When turned over October 1992 October 1992 June 1990 June 1990
Design area (ha) 131 193 150 441
Irrigated area (ha)   68 190 150 430
Water user association Harapan Jaya Guna Tirta Guna Mekar Cibadugawiru
Main soil type Latosol Latosol Latosol Latosol
Main crop(s) Rice Rice Rice Rice
Water source Klopo river Kodil river Cibojong river Citaal river
System type River diversion River diversion River diversion River diversion
Turnout type Sluice gates Sluice gates Sluice gates Sluice gates
Irrigation structures 42 51 22 49
Lowest water
measurement point Main canal Main canal None Main canal
Average annual rainfall (mm) 3,034 3,199 3,021 2,059
Length of main canal (km )        4.4        7.0        6.0        2.5
Total length of canal network (km )        4.4        7.2        6.5        7.8
Area served/length of canal (ha/km)      15.5      26.2      23.1      55.1
FIGURE 1.
Study locations in Java.4
damaged structures. The farmer survey elicited
data on farmer perceptions of performance before
and after turnover, crop yields, and costs of
irrigation. Farmers were selected by random
sampling, stratified by distance from the main
water intake. Using layout maps, each system
was divided into three blocks (head, middle and
tail). Farm parcels in each block were given
numbers and parcels were selected randomly
within each block with the aid of a table of random
numbers.
2 Secondary data (where available and
checked for reliability) were used to compare
irrigation intensities, yields, productivity and
profitability of irrigated agriculture between two
sets of irrigation systems in both provinces:
turned-over and non-turned-over systems. Data on
water irrigation issues were obtained from the
rainfall varies between 1,000 mm and 5,000 mm.
In 1990, the total average annual water yield for
all river basins in the country was approximately
14,000 m
3 per capita. However, due to the high
population densities in Java, the average per
capita yield is less than one-tenth of the national
average in several water basins. Due to rapid
increases in population (3 million added per year)
and economic diversification, competition for
water—between irrigation, domestic and municipal
use and industry—is becoming severe in the more
densely populated and economically active regions
of Java, Bali and Sumatra.
The total irrigated area is approximately
7.1 million hectares, of which about 5.5 million are
served by government irrigation systems and
1.6 million are farmer-managed (Soeparmono and
Sutardi 1998). Small-scale irrigation is a vital part
of the sector, with over 2.1 million hectares of
irrigated land being in irrigation systems that serve
2Sample sizes were 50 farmers in Kaliduren, 50 in Planditan, 44 in Cinangka II, and 62 in Cipanumbangan.
3Farmland is counted as rice land if at least one rice crop per year is harvested.
records available with the irrigation agencies. For
the extensive data sample, several irrigation
systems were deleted from the sample because of
unreliable data. The time line observed for the
quantitative performance indicators was
5 years before turnover and 5 years after turnover
(if this much time had elapsed). Statistical tests
of significance were done to analyze differences in
levels and trends of key quantitative indicators.
Information on the management context and
turnover process in the four irrigation systems was
obtained from farmer key informants and field
operations staff of the Sukabumi and Kuningan
District Irrigation Services of West Java and the
Bogowonto District Irrigation Service of Central
Java.
Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover Program in Indonesia
Irrigated Agriculture in Indonesia
Agriculture contributes 16.5 percent to the
Indonesian gross domestic product and employs
44 percent of the labor force. The total crop-
harvested area in Indonesia is approximately
11.44 million hectares. This has been growing at a
rate of about 187,000 ha/yr. during the early
1990s. The most important agricultural crop is
rice. Of the 9 million plus hectares of rice
farmland in Indonesia, nearly 71 percent is
irrigated.
3 Nationwide, average rice yields are in
the range of 4 to 6 tons/ha. After rice, other major
irrigated crops are sugarcane, maize, legumes,
tomato, chili, onion and other vegetables.
As a whole, Indonesia has relatively abundant
supplies of water. It has 21 percent of the
freshwater resources available to the Asia and
Pacific region with only 6.2 percent of the
population of the region. The average annual5
less than 500 hectares each. This is 30 percent of
the entire irrigated area.
Between 1969 and 1994 about 1.44 million
hectares of new irrigated lands were created
through the construction of irrigation systems.
Existing systems serving 3.36 million hectares
were rehabilitated, extended or upgraded. During
this period, Indonesia spent US$10 billion on
irrigation development, 71 percent of which was
funded through external loans (Soeparmono and
Sutardi 1998).
Between 1974 and 1983, under the Sederhana
Irrigation Projects (I & II), the government
rehabilitated or constructed 980 small-scale
irrigation systems, serving 400,000 hectares in
23 provinces. The word sederhana means simple,
which is how the government originally perceived
small-scale irrigation systems during this period.
The project was highly centralized and rapidly
implemented, which is a characteristic of green
revolution programs. Except for a few pilot
projects, farmers were generally not consulted
about what improvements or structures were
needed and were not expected to contribute any
of their own equity. Contractors normally carried
out construction and the Department of Agriculture
was responsible for the development of WUAs.
It is widely recognized that the Sederhana
Project was riddled with problems of faulty design
and construction. At the system level, following
project implementation, confusion frequently arose
over whose responsibility it was to maintain and
repair structures that had been built by the
government. Where sizeable structures had been
built, the government often installed a permanent
staff and reclassified the system from a village
system to a government system, incorporating it
into the public inventory of irrigation systems.
4
Even in the systems that had remained as village
systems, damaged structures were often left
unrepaired for years, because they were
irrelevant in the first place, farmers were not
organized or willing to make the repairs, or
because the farmers and the government thought
it was each other’s responsibility to make the
repairs.
Lack of farmer participation, focus on
physical works, and lack of clarity about the
status of the systems and responsibility for
management have been typical of the
organizational culture of government-led small-
scale irrigation development in Indonesia. As will
be seen below, these characteristics have
continued to the present and have apparently
created a fundamental inconsistency between
means and ends in the Small-Scale Irrigation
Turnover Program. Nevertheless, the goals of the
green revolution for immediate increases in
agricultural production were met and the
Sederhana Project was considered a success.
The average rice yields in project systems in
Java rose from 2.4 tons/ha in 1968 to 4.5 tons/
ha in 1983. An econometric analysis has
estimated that approximately 16 percent of the
increase in yields can be attributed to the
enhancement of irrigation systems (Varley 1997).
With the green revolution the problem of low
productivity had, apparently, been solved. But the
problem of unsustainability of the production
system itself was soon to follow. Today’s
environment is one of rising competition for water
and irrigated land, increasing multiple uses of
water and growing commercialization of
agriculture. Observers argue that unless the WUA
is granted stronger legal and political clout (vis-à-
vis village governments and private-sector
interests), it will be ineffective in dealing with the
problems of rising water scarcity and competition
(see Ganjar, Avianto, and Bruns 1997) and with
the management of irrigation systems for multiple
uses. It will be unable to effectively adopt a
business orientation and fend for itself in an
4By law, all systems with government investment were classified as government systems. Central Java inventoried all systems over 10
hectares and included them in the inventory of government systems.6
emerging environment where water will necessarily
be treated largely as an economic good (see
Helmi 1997).
By the mid-1980s, central and provincial
governments were finding it increasingly difficult to
finance the recurring cost of O&M for the rapidly
expanding irrigation service area. Infrastructure
was deteriorating rapidly, which necessitated
expensive rehabilitation projects that became
recurring  events. Farmers were not paying the full
cost of  O&M. Generally, they considered the
management and financing of government-
developed systems to be the responsibility of the
government. By the late 1980s there were strong
pressures on the government to shift from
expansion of irrigation to enhancement of irrigation
management, with an emphasis on finding
solutions to the problem of non-sustainability of
irrigation systems.
those serving less than 500 ha) would be
transferred to WUAs by the year 2003. This would
affect 2.1 million hectares of public irrigation
service area. Systems with service areas of less
than 150 hectares would be given first priority.
Implementation began in 1987 with pilot
implementation of turnover in West Java and West
Sumatra.
The policy stated that, after turnover, the
WUAs would assume responsibility for O&M of all
infrastructure, water delivery and drainage from the
intake to fields and drains. For small-scale
irrigation, the irrigation agency was to change its
role from direct management to the provision of
technical and physical assistance and regulatory
support. The agency was to restrict its role in
direct management to larger-scale irrigation
systems and river basins. The policy was
ambiguous about who would be responsible for
management of weirs and intakes.
5
The following reasons were given for the
adoption of the turnover policy (Soenarno
1995):
 Inability of provincial governments to provide
sufficient funds for irrigation O&M.
 Inability of the central government to provide a
sufficient subsidy to provincial governments to
finance the cost of O&M (it could only provide
50% of the estimated subsidy required).
 The Land and Building Tax and Irrigation
Service Fee were not effective and could not
be expected to alleviate the government’s
financial shortfall in the irrigation subsector.
 Management of irrigation systems by the
provincial irrigation services was considered to
be unsatisfactory.
 Farmers managed many of the small irrigation
systems rehabilitated or extended under the
5The government has remained flexible on this issue and there is variation in practice between provinces and districts. However, the
government often retains staff to operate larger weirs and intakes.
Turnover Policy
In 1987, the Indonesian National Planning Board
(Bappenas) issued the Government Policy
Statement of 1987 on the Operation and
Maintenance of Irrigation Systems. The statement
provided new direction for the irrigation subsector.
This included mandates to:
 turn over management of all public irrigation
systems of 500 hectares or less in service
area to WUAs
 introduce an irrigation service fee for farmers
in all public irrigation systems
 introduce more efficient O&M procedures in
public irrigation systems
The policy for small-scale irrigation determined
that all small-scale irrigation systems (defined as7
Sederhana Project before the project
reclassified them as public systems.
In addition to the above-announced reasons,
there appear to be three other kinds of pressure
motivating the turnover policy.
First, rice yields on irrigated land had
apparently reached their peak by the mid-1980s
and it was envisioned that future increases in
production would have to come through increases
in cropping or irrigation intensity and extension of
functional command areas. These increases would
depend more on improvements in water
management than in production inputs.
Second, by the late 1980s it had already been
more than 10 years since rehabilitation of most of
the Sederhana Project systems and many were in
need of repair (from the point of view of the
government). It was thought that the turnover
program would provide an avenue through which
funds could be mobilized for the repair of small-
scale irrigation systems.
Third, through the mid-1990s all turnover
activity had been connected with external donor
funds. The donors have pushed for this reform
and it is questionable whether the government
would have implemented the reform on its own
initiative. The major sources have been the World
Bank (Irrigation Subsector Projects I and II in
10 provinces, and the Java Irrigation and Water
Management Project, which covered four
provinces in Java) and the Asian Development
Bank (Third Irrigation Sector Project, Integrated
Irrigation Sector Project, and Nusa Tenggara
Agricultural Development Project, Sumatra, Central
Java, and Nusa Tenggara).
The immediate objectives of the turnover
program clarified in 1991 (Soenarno 1995) were:
 to increase farmer participation in the O&M of
small-scale irrigation systems
 to decrease or eliminate the dependence of
WUAs on government assistance and
increase their overall self-reliance
 to improve the O&M of small-scale irrigation
systems
These objectives were not necessarily
mutually consistent. The key interest of the
government was to decrease its financial burden
in irrigation. It was assumed that decreased
dependence of farmers on the government would
also be of interest to the farmers and would lead
to improved management performance. But it
remains an empirical question as to whether
turnover has been in the financial and economic
interest of farmers. We assess the evidence below.
Turnover Process
Priority was given to provinces, which had large
concentrations of small-scale irrigation systems.
At the field-level, priority was given to systems,
which
 were below 150 hectares in area
 did not require heavy repairs (not more than
US$100/ha)
 did not have difficult or complex O&M
requirements
 had existing WUAs and farmers who appeared
receptive to the turnover program
 used water in the systems almost entirely for
irrigation
Hence, as is the case in other countries, the
government tended to transfer the easier and
better performing systems in the early stages of
the program. Over time, the program increasingly
dealt with more problematic systems.
After a pilot phase between 1987 and 1989,
the Ministry of Public Works published an official
regulation about implementing procedures for
small-scale irrigation turnover and administrative8
powers of the WUA (GOI 1989). The first step in
the turnover process was for the provincial and
district irrigation agencies to make an inventory of
all eligible systems (Bruns and Atmanto 1992). As
farmers were not consulted they had no choice
about whether their system was included in the
turnover program or not.
Basic data were collected from offices about
numbers of agency staff placed in the system,
technical level and the functional condition of
infrastructure and the existence of a WUA. From
these data, provincial and district offices
categorized systems into three groups:
 public systems without any agency staff,
which would simply be administratively
reclassified as farmer-managed irrigation
systems (without going through the normal
turnover process)
 public systems where agency staff were
assigned to help manage the system, but
which did not need repair or improvement of
infrastructure (which would only receive help in
organizing and developing the WUA, to the
extent needed)
 public systems where members of the agency
staff were assigned to help manage the
system and where significant repairs or
improvements were needed prior to turnover
After these classifications were made,
provincial and district governments prioritized
which systems would be turned over in which
order and made schedules for implementation. At
the district level, annual budgets were estimated
with the guideline that an average of US$100/ha
would be spent for pre-turnover physical repairs
and improvements for the last category of the
above-mentioned three systems.
At the system level, a WUA organizer and
staff of the subdistrict office carried out a “socio-
technical profile.” The profile produced a detailed
description of the management context and
physical condition of irrigation infrastructure. It
also included recommendations for what
improvements should be made to the
infrastructure and “farmer versions” of the design
of repairs and improvements, which were simple
sketches of structures needed, prepared by farmer
representatives. The profile also included
recommendations for what organizing efforts were
needed for the WUA. One important finding that
emerged from the inventories and profiles was
that, prior to turnover, farmers were already
performing a lot, and often a majority of the
management tasks in the systems, regardless of
whether or not members of the agency staff were
formally assigned to the systems. Hence, for
many, and probably most systems, turnover did
not constitute a major change in actual
management practices.
The profile was followed by the preparation of
a “technical version” of the design (which was
supposed to be based on the original farmer
version) by irrigation district staff or local
consultants. This included cost estimates and a
work schedule. This was followed by
construction, which normally involved the water
users as laborers. Although this was not a
requirement, farmers often contributed their own
labor and materials to add to what the
government was financing.
6 Despite the attempts
to elicit farmer suggestions for repairs and
improvements, it was clear to all that the
initiative and financing were coming from the
government. Furthermore, there was some
uncertainty as to who would be responsible for
rehabilitation and modernization of irrigation
infrastructure in the future—the government or
the farmers.
6Farmer contributions were a point of contention with World Bank supervision missions for ISSP I & II. At least during some periods,
contributions were supposed to be mandatory, and they were monitored.9
These aspects of the process probably did not
help reverse the conventional perception among
farmers that the irrigation system was primarily
the government’s responsibility. Farmers who had
observed an extended pattern of government-
sponsored assistance were not easily dissuaded
from their custom of deferring substantial
maintenance problems and speculating that the
government could easily be enticed to return and
make the repairs.
Parallel to the physical improvements, the
irrigation institutional organizer and district staff
facilitated the organization of a WUA and training
in system management. They also assisted with
administrative and legal tasks related to
formalizing management turnover, which included
a formal acknowledgement of the bupati (head of
the district) and the governor of the province.
However, since the WUA was not formally
established until after the physical improvements
had been made by the government, the group of
water users did not have the opportunity to arrive
at an official group agreement about the
improvements beforehand. This is likely to have
reinforced the notion among farmers that the
system is not fully theirs and that the government
is likely to return again in the future and make
other repairs when needed.
At the system level, the turnover process was
supposed to be completed within about 18
months, spread over two budget years. This
meant that the formation or restructuring of the
WUA took place simultaneously with the design
and construction of the physical repairs. Reports
from key informants and other researchers
indicated that several problems or inconsistencies
have arisen during implementation of the turnover
program. The more significant ones are:
 Crop choices or quotas are often still
imposed by local government authorities,
despite Basic Law 12 of 1992 about farm
cultivation.
 Although farmer consultations were carried out
during design, construction was not done in
accordance with the design agreed with
farmers.
 The irrigation agency has reportedly been
“preoccupied” with physical repair works
(which are its normal focus) and has given
inadequate attention to, and been ineffective
in, organizing farmers (for which agency staff
have been ill-prepared).
 WUAs (P3A) or their federated representatives
are not included as members of the provincial-
or district-level panitia irigasi (irrigation
committee), which has the role of deciding
water allocation and use restrictions.
 The WUA is still legally and politically weak
although there are mounting pressures for it to
exercise more legal clout (such as to require
full payment for irrigation costs from all
beneficiaries, to settle water disputes, and to
invest in agribusiness or agro-industrial
ventures as a business cooperative).
 Neither the WUA nor the individual farmers
have any legally valid water rights whereby
they can defend themselves from increasing
competition for water.
 The turnover program has generally been
implemented according to rigid administrative
guidelines, quotas, schedules, and standard
training materials rather than according to a
flexible process of negotiation and solving
local management problems.
 The agency charged with the responsibility to
implement the turnover program is itself the
most inclined to resist the change. Due to
reluctance or inability to transfer staff,
members of the agency field operations staff10
often remain assigned to an irrigation system
even after it has been formally turned over.
 It is apparent that the irrigation service agency
has not adopted the role of providing technical
guidance to systems after they had been
turned over.
It was in 1990 that the first systems in West
Java and West Sumatra were turned over to
farmer management. The turnover program quickly
spread to most of the provinces in Indonesia. The
most concentrated attention in the early years was
given to Java, where most of the small-scale
irrigation systems were located. According to the
initial indications, the results of the turnover
program were relatively positive, without significant
negative consequences (Bruns, Kurnia, and
Tajidan1994; Mott-MacDonald International
Ltd.1993). However, by 1997, after 10 years of
implementation, only 420,000 hectares of small-
scale irrigation service areas had been officially
turned over to WUAs (Soeparmono and Sutardi
1998). This was only 47 percent of the
900,000-hectare target area, which is supposed to
be reached by the year 2003. The program is
considerably behind schedule, reportedly due to the
decision, in practice, that all systems should have
improvements built before turnover, which has
resulted in administrative difficulties with contracts,
reluctance about the program by the provincial and
district irrigation services (which are the primary
implementers), disagreements between the
government and farmers, and funding constraints.
selected for this study. Each of these systems
has a masonry weir that diverts water through an
adjustable intake gate into a main canal, which is
completely or mostly unlined. There is a staff
gauge at the intake but there are no discharge
measurement devices downstream of the
headworks. Water is diverted directly into field
channels from offtakes located along the main
canal. Overflow structures, silt flushing gates,
division boxes, flumes and culverts are the
common structures.
At the field-channel level, irrigation and
drainage are often integrated in the same
channels. Water often flows from field to field.
Average farm sizes in Java are only betweem
one-fourth and one-third of a hectare. The
government estimates that the irrigation
efficiencies of such small-scale systems are only
about 40 percent to 50 percent. However, this is
largely irrelevant at the water basin level due to
the extensive and repeated return flows into the
river basin between the headwaters and the river
mouth.
Table 2 summarizes the powers vested with
WUAs and the functions turned over to them in
the systems from West and Central Java selected
for the study. Because irrigation turnover is a
national program, the basic functions and powers
devolved are the same between provinces.
However, due to differences in scale and
complexity of structures, variation occurs between
systems in the amount of the hydraulic network
transferred to farmer control. In Cipanumbangan
and Cinangka II in West Java, the agency
continued to control the intakes after turnover. It
even continued to exercise partial control over the
main canal systems in Planditan, Kaliduren and
Cinangka II after turnover. So, turnover  is not a
singular phenomenon and often involves only a
limited degree of devolution of authority and all
four systems continued to have some form of
joint-management.
Turnover Context and Process in
Sample Irrigation Systems
The vast majority of irrigation systems in
Indonesia are river diversion, surface canal
systems. This is particularly true of small-scale
systems and of each of the four systems11
In all four systems, WUA became a legal
entity and had the authority to make its own rules
and  sanctions respecting irrigation. The maximum
sanction authorized legally is temporary
termination of the water delivery service (which,
however, may be problematic where water flows
from field to field). In theory, the WUA has full
authority over O&M, setting water fees, hiring
of staff, canal rights of way, entering into
contracts, and making profits. No water rights
are granted to the association or to individuals.
Provisions for the transfer of assets were
not implemented. This resulted in ambiguity
in the authority of WUAs to carry out
improvements to the physical infrastructure.
7
The government allocates water according
to administrative rules and priorities.  Some
of the key tasks carried out during and after
transfer in the sample systems are listed in
table 3.
TABLE 2.
Powers devolved and functions turned over to WUAs.
Arrangements and function Planditan Kaliduren Cipanumbangan Cinangka II
WUA is legal entity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Authority to make rules and sanctions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maximum sanction available to WUA Water stopped Water stopped Water stopped Water stopped
Maximum sanction given since turnover Warning Warning Warning Warning
Authority for O&M plan and budget Yes Yes Yes Yes
Authority to set water fees Yes Yes Yes Yes
Authority to hire or release staff Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal water right at level of system or No, govt. No, govt. No, govt. No, govt.
  farmer organization allocation allocation allocation allocation
Control over intake Partial Partial No No
Control over main canal system Partial Partial Yes No
Control over subsidiary canal system Yes Yes Yes Yes
Responsibility for future rehabilitation Yes/NR* Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR
Canal rights of way Yes Yes Yes Yes
WUA right to contract and raise funds Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR
WUA right to make profits Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR
*NR means not yet realized.
7It is reported there had been some transfer of assets.12
An important concept for management transfer is
that devolution of management functions to water
users is expected to induce changes in system
management practices that would improve
management efficiency. This proposition is tested
from data obtained from the four sample irrigation
systems from the Central and West Java.  In this
study, two measures were used as indicators of
management efficiency. These were:
 the perceived effort needed by farmers to
arrange water deliveries to their fields
 the responsiveness of irrigation management
staff to farmer suggestions and concerns
In Kaliduren and Planditan in Central Java,
68 percent and 42 percent, respectively, of
farmers interviewed perceived that efforts required
to arrange water delivery to their fields in the
second season had changed from ‘difficult’ to
‘easy’ after turnover (figure 2). About 26 percent in
both systems said this was ‘easy’ both before and
after turnover. In Cipanumbangan and Cinangka II
systems in West Java, between 45 percent and
55 percent of farmers said it was easy to arrange
second-season water deliveries both before and
after turnover. Twenty to 35 percent felt that
arranging water deliveries had changed from
‘difficult’ to ‘easy’ after turnover.
Regarding responsiveness of management
staff to farmer concerns, the majority of farmers in
Kaliduren and Planditan reported either an
improvement in responsiveness or no change,
while about 20 percent in both systems reported
less-responsiveness of staff after turnover. This
may be the perception of those who had special
pay-for-service relationships with government staff
before turnover. In the Cipanumbangan and
Cinangka II systems in West Java, between
TABLE 3.
Actions during and after the turnover process.
Transfer activity Planditan Kaliduren Cipanumbangan Cinangka II
Selection of  WUA leadership by farmers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment of WUAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Training of farmer representatives Limited Limited Limited Limited
Training of management staff Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal
Improvement of intake and/or main canal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Repair or improvement of subsidiary network No No No No
Have farmers helped prioritize improvement? Nominally Nominally Nominally Nominally
Investment in improvements by farmers No No No Minimal
Revision of O&M procedures and/or plans No Yes No Yes
Revision of water charge No No No No
Reduction or elimination of government  financing Yes Yes Yes Yes
Removal of some government staff Yes No Yes Yes
Is future responsibility for rehabilitation known? Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain
Management Efficiency, Organizational Viability,
and Support Systems13
60 percent and 75 percent of farmers interviewed
reported no change in staff responsiveness after
turnover; about 18 percent in both systems
perceived an improvement in responsiveness of
management staff after turnover.
The term organizational viability refers to the
post-turnover capacity of the local organization to
mobilize the support and resources necessary to
continue to meet its objectives in the long run.
The indicators that most closely measure
organizational viability are:
 farmer support for the organization
 adequacy of fees paid by farmers to the
organization
 external legal recognition and political
acceptance of the organization
There are reasons to be dubious about the
organizational viability of WUAs in Java, which
have as their area of jurisdiction the hydraulic
service area boundary of a river diversion weir.
Survey data indicate that the ratio of farmers who
use water from the irrigation system but who
have no knowledge of the existence of the WUA
(5 years after turnover), and have never joined in
a meeting or maintenance activity is 40 percent
in the Planditan system, 42 percent in the
Kaliduren system, and 30 percent in the
Cinangka II system. Over 80 percent of farmers
interviewed in these systems did not know about
the activities or water distribution arrangements
of the WUAs.
Second, there are no fees paid in cash by
farmers in any of the four systems. Traditionally,
irrigation fees are paid in kind (paddy) to the
village irrigation officer and unpaid labor is
contributed to seasonal canal maintenance. There
are no fees of any kind in the two systems in
Central Java and the large majority of farmers
interviewed reported that the level of family labor
for canal maintenance is the same after turnover
FIGURE 2.
Perceived efforts of farmers to arrange water delivery.14
as before. In the Cinangka II system in West
Java, 65 percent of farmers interviewed reported
no change in the amount of payments in kind
while 25 percent did not pay fees. Most reported
no change in the amount of labor inputs for canal
maintenance. In the Cipanumbangan system in
West Java, 89 percent of farmers sampled pay
fees in kind, of which 59 percent said their fee
payments had increased after turnover and
39 percent said they had remained the same. The
picture is one of a rather weak and relaxed
posture toward resource mobilization. The
implications of this for the physical sustainability
of infrastructure will be seen in the section on
O&M performance below.
Third, the political apparatus of the state
comes down to the village level in Indonesia.
Except in Bali and a few other local areas,
irrigation has traditionally been managed at the
local level by the desa (the village government).
Water-sharing arrangements or disputes between
subsections of an irrigation system, which cut
across different village boundaries, have been
traditionally handled between village governments.
This is still the case, even after transfer. Although
WUAs may now be granted formal legal statuses,
they lack political recognition. Banks are still
reluctant to make loans to them. WUAs that cut
across multiple villages (which is the case with
most systems below 500 ha in service area) still
make rotational arrangements and settle disputes
through village governments rather than through
the formal association.
According to the turnover policy, as the
government withdraws from routine O&M it is
supposed to take on the role of providing support
services to irrigation systems, which have been
turned over to farmer management (Bruns and
Helmi 1996). These include:
 providing technical guidance for
operations
 preventive maintenance and modernization
 facilitating local investment in infrastructure
repairs or improvements
 regulating allocation of water along the river
course
 managing weirs and intakes
 helping the WUA improve its management
procedures
Among the above types of services, so far
the only one that has been extended is direct
management of the intake. The other support
services are not being provided. Reportedly,
district governments do not have a clear program
and allocate only small budgets for these
functions.
Operational Performance
This section examines the impact of management
transfer on the operational performance of
irrigation systems. It is hypothesized that turnover
leads to an efficient and more equitable water
distribution and thus increased irrigation intensity.
Water Distribution
Quantitative data on water distribution are not
available below the intake in any of the four
systems. Therefore, we collected data on farmer15
interviewed perceived that the frequency of water-
related disputes among farmers in the system had
decreased after turnover. Only a very small
number of farmers in any of the systems reported
a worse situation after turnover.
Regarding timeliness of water deliveries, the
majority of farmers in Planditan, Cipanumbangan
and Cinangka II reported no change, although
between 20 percent and 30 percent of farmers in
Planditan and Cinangka II reported improvement.
About 55 percent of farmers in Kaliduren reported
an improvement in the timeliness of water delivery
after turnover. Another 40 percent reported
satisfactory timeliness before and after turnover.
Irrigation Intensity8
The annual irrigation intensity between 1991 and
1997 was compared for 66 small-scale irrigation
systems in West Java and Central Java:
34 transferred and 32 non-transferred systems.
Figure 4 shows the mean annual irrigation
intensities for the two groups of systems during
1991–1996. It is evident that the mean irrigation
intensity in the transferred systems is higher than
in the non-transferred systems. Regression
analysis was carried out to compare the trend in
irrigation intensity between the transferred and the
non-transferred systems during  the period




Y  = Dependent variable (irrigation intensity),
 = 1 for turned-over systems,
= 0 for non-turned-over systems,
= Time in years (1991–1996),
 =  Intercept,
 = The difference in the dependent variable
(irrigation intensity) between transferred and
non-transferred systems,
perceptions about operational performance before
and after turnover. We asked farmers in the
sample systems about the five measures of
operational performance and how they have
changed after turnover, if at all. We paid special
attention to the second irrigation season (April/
May to July/ August) since this is a regular but
water-sensitive season. The four measures were:
 adequacy of irrigation water supplied to the
farm
 fairness of water distribution within the system
 frequency of water distribution conflicts
 timeliness of water delivery to the farm
Figure 3 gives the details on farmer
perceptions about system operations in the
selected systems. A majority of farmers
interviewed in Planditan, Cipanumbangan, and
Cinangka II reported no change in water adequacy
after turnover, some farmers saying it was
adequate both before and after turnover, and
others claiming it was inadequate before and
afterwards. The exception was Kaliduren, where
the majority of farmers reported an improvement in
water adequacy after turnover.
Farmer perceptions about the fairness of water
distribution were more positive. A majority in all
four systems perceived that water distribution was
either fair before and after turnover or was unfair
before turnover but had become fair afterwards. In
Kaliduren and Planditan, between 40 percent and
50 percent felt water distribution had improved
from unfair to fair after turnover. In
Cipanumbangan, 20 percent felt that water
distribution was unfair both before and after
turnover, but in the other systems this ratio was
much smaller.
It is significant that in all four systems
between 60 percent and 80 percent of farmers
8Irrigation intensity is defined as the ratio of the gross annual area irrigated to the irrigable area and is expressed in percentage terms.
The design area is taken as the irrigable area.16
FIGURE 3.
Farmer perceptions about operational performance.
Slope coefficient giving the trend of the dependent
         variable (irrigation intensity) for the non-trans
         ferred systems during the period 1991–1996,
Slope coefficient indicating the differential effects
       of the transferred systems on the trend in the
        dependent variable (irrigation intensity) during the
        period  1991–1996, and
Error term.
The following parameter estimates (with t-statistic
within parentheses) were obtained using equation (1):
Y(irrigation intensity) = 203.79 - 8.118Di + 2.341.Xi + 5.911 ( DiXi )
   (19.72)    (-0.582)   (0.917)   (1.695)
                                   R2=0.045 F statistic = 4.4	
The results indicate that there is no
statistically significant difference (at the 5% level)
in the trend in irrigation intensity during the period
1991–1996 between the transferred and the
non-transferred systems.17
FIGURE 4a.
Trend in annual irrigation intensity of non-turned-over systems, West and Central Java.
FIGURE 4b.
Trend in annual irrigation intensity of turned-over systems, West and Central Java.18
This section assesses the impact of management
transfer on the maintenance of irrigation facilities
by farmers.  It is hypothesized that management
transfer will bring about improvements in the
maintenance of the irrigation facilities. The
proposition was tested by carrying out an irrigation
infrastructure assessment survey in the four
systems selected for the study. The intake and
full length of all main and distributary canals were
inspected during the irrigation season in 1997 to
determine the functional condition of the
infrastructure after turnover. This provides insight
into the quality of maintenance after turnover, and,
together with data on levels of spending on
maintenance, provides an indication of the extent
to which the WUAs are keeping up or falling
behind in maintenance.
 Canal reaches and structures were classified
as ‘functional,’ ‘nearly dysfunctional,’ and
‘dysfunctional.’
9 Canal lengths were considered
‘defective’ if one of the following problems existed
and if it interfered with the desired hydraulic
operation:
 constriction or enlargement of the canal cross
section
 visible siltation and/or encroachment of
freeboard or adjacent road
 visible seepage
 slippage, scouring, or other defects in the
embankment
 cracks or other damage to the canal lining
Table 4 shows the percentage of total
inspected canal length in each system that was
observed to be functional, nearly dysfunctional,
and dysfunctional. For three of the four systems,
between 93 percent and 96 percent were fully
functional and there was only a modest degree of
nearly dysfunctional canal length. Cipanumbangan
was the only system that had a worrisome amount
of nearly dysfunctional canal length (33%). This
indicates what can be considered as a lack of
preventive maintenance, or conversely, a
significant amount of “deferred maintenance.”
Control, conveyance, measurement, and
ancillary structures were considered defective
(i.e., dysfunctional or nearly dysfunctional) if one
of the following conditions was present:
Maintenance Performance
9A functional structure is defined as one that can currently perform its basic design function and shows no signs of losing this capacity
within about a year. A nearly dysfunctional structure is one that is considered likely to become unable to perform its basic function within
about a year. A dysfunctional structure is one that was unable to perform its basic function at the time of the inspection. For canal
reaches, dysfunctional means it is unable to convey at least 70% of the desired flow capacity. Nearly dysfunctional means it is likely to
become dysfunctional within about a year.
TABLE 4.
Functional condition of canal lengths inspected.
District Total length of Dysfunctional Nearly Functional length
 canal network (km)    length (%) dysfunctional (%)   length (%)
Planditan 4.0 0  6 94
Kaliduren 6.5 1  3 96
Cipanumbangan 6.5 0 33 67
Cinangka II 7.8 0  7 9319
17 percent to 18 percent were nearly dysfunctional
(indicating some deferred maintenance). In
Cipanumbangan and Cinangka II, West Java, only
55 percent and 68 percent, respectively, of all
structures were fully functional. In
Cipanumbangan, 41 percent of all structures were
nearly dysfunctional even though physical
improvements were made in the system just prior
to turnover in 1992.
10  As part of the inspections,
cost estimates were made for the repair of all
dysfunctional and nearly dysfunctional canal
sections and structures in the systems.
Dysfunctional canal sections and structures were
considered to be an “essential maintenance” cost.
Nearly dysfunctional items were considered to be
a “preventive maintenance” cost. The
accumulation of both was considered as the total
deferred maintenance requirement.
Table 6, compares post-turnover average
annual maintenance expenditure levels by WUAs
with the accumulated deferred maintenance
costs. This comparison enables us to estimate
the percentage increase in maintenance
investment over current levels, which would be
required to handle current routine maintenance
and take care of all essential maintenance
requirements within 1 year as well as all
preventive maintenance requirements within
3 years.
 scouring of canal around structures
 the approach section, rubble pack, or wings of
structures are breaking apart
 the water control structure cannot control flow
as intended (due to gates or sills missing,
eroded, or damaged, significant leakage at
gates, or damaged mechanism of movable
structures)
 the water measurement structure cannot be
used to measure flow due to a damaged or
missing gauge, recorder, or other component
 the civil works of ancillary structures are
damaged or poorly constructed
Table 5 shows the number of structures
inspected that were found to be functional, nearly
dysfunctional, and dysfunctional. In general, the
frequency of disrepair is more common for
structures than for canal lengths (to the extent the
two can be compared). This is probably because
structures tend to be movable, more difficult, or
impossible for farmers to repair, and their design
is sometimes incompatible with farmer principles
of water allocation.
In both systems in Central Java only
76 percent of structures were fully functional, and
10Apparently, this was due to the poor quality of rehabilitation works, which may be an indication that farmers did not play an important
role in supervising rehabilitation.
TABLE 5.
Functional condition of structures inspected.
District Total Dysfunctional  Nearly          Functional
structures in structures (%) dysfunctional      structures (%)
system structures (%)
Planditan 42    7  17 76
Kalidure 51     6   18 76
Cipanumbanan 22     4   41 55
Cinangka II 49   16   16 6820
In table 6, last row (f) shows that substantial
increases in investment would be required in
Planditan (719%), Kaliduren (36%), and
Cinangka II (140%) to eliminate all deferred
maintenance as indicated. Data on current
maintenance spending levels for Cipanumbangan
are not available, due to lack of records. However,
we can see that the cost of eliminating the
backlog of deferred maintenance in
Cipanumbangan is comparable with those of
Cinangka II and Planditan. These findings indicate
that, after turnover, farmers have not begun to
invest in the long-term maintenance of the
irrigation systems. The conventional pattern of
farmers deferring some maintenance costs until
the government might return with external
assistance for rehabilitation has apparently not
been overcome by turnover.
The majority of farmers interviewed in the
two systems in Central Java reported that the
condition of the canal network and structures
improved after turnover.  Most farmers in the
two systems in West Java said that
maintenance had either improved or was good
both before and after turnover (figure 5). In
Planditan and Cipanumbangan, between
15 percent and 20 percent of the farmers
interviewed said that the infrastructure was
worse afterwards. This was apparently due to
some dissatisfaction with the quality of repair
work done by contractors prior to turnover.
When asked what the most important
maintenance problems were, most farmers
responded that they constituted the poor
condition of the main or distributary canals.
WUA leaders interviewed in all four systems
reported to researchers that they expected the
government would return within 5 years’ time
to finance another rehabilitation of their
system.
TABLE 6.
Capacity for financing maintenance in systems turned over.
Maintenance expenditures Planditan Kaliduren Cipanum- Cinangka II
requirements and bangan
(June 1997 US$/ha)
a. Current average annual maintenance
expenditure    3.37 11.83 na  13.63
b. Accumulated essential maintenance cost 22.7  2.24 19.67  17.83
c. Accumulated preventive maintenance cost    4.51  5.82   2.78    3.59
d. Total deferred maintenance requirement 27.2 8.06 22.45  21.42
e. Expenditure required for routine and essential
maintenance (in 1 year) and preventive
maintenance (in 3 years)  27.57 16.01 20.50  32.66
f. Required annual budget increase
719% 36% na 140%
*In this context, dysfunctional structures are considered as an essential maintenance requirement. Nearly dysfunctional structures are
considered as a preventive maintenance requirement. In Cipanumbangan, WUA representatives did not have data on recent annual
maintenance expenditures. na = data not availabe.21
This section examines the impact of
management transfer on agricultural production.
The hypothesis advanced is that irrigation
management transfer will result in an
improvement in agricultural productivity levels.
The hypothesis is tested by comparing crop
yields between systems that have been turned
over to farmer management and those that
are under agency management, and on the basis
of farmer perceptions about changes in crop
yield before and after turnover in the four case
study systems selected from West and Central
Java.
FIGURE 5.
Farmer perceptions about canal maintenance in the selected systems.
Agricultural Productivity
Crop Yields
Table 7 gives the mean seasonal paddy yield in
the sample of 35 turned-over and 36 non-turned-
over systems from West and Central Java during
the 5-year period 1991–96.
11 The results of the t-
test carried out indicate that there is no
statistically significant (at 5% level) difference in
the mean yield of paddy between the two groups
in the first and the third season.  In the second
season, the mean paddy yield in the non-turned-
over systems is significantly higher than the yield
in the turned-over systems.
11The yields recorded in the systems in the two selected locations seem to be much higher than the national average yield.22
TABLE 7.
Mean paddy yield during 1991–96 in the turned-over and non-turned-over systems.
Season systems Turned-over systems Non-turned-over t-statistic
(tons/ha) (tons/ha)
Season 1 6.0 6.2 - 0.796
(1.1) (1.3)
Season 2 5.9 6.4 - 2.56*
(1.2) (1.6)
Season 3 5.4 5.2 0.794
(1.1) (1.3)
*Difference in mean yield between turned-over and non-turned-over systems is statistically significant at the
 5 percent level.
The regression model specified in equation 1
was fitted to compare the trend in paddy yields
between the two categories of systems during the
period 1991–1996. The data were adjusted for
seasonal and locational (Central and West Java)
variations in yields. Figures 6a and 6b give the
trend in the yields during the reference period in
the non-turned-over and turned-over systems,
respectively. The parameter estimates (with
t-statistic within parentheses) obtained were as
follows:
Yield (tons/ha) = 5.498-1.826 Di+0.0075 Xi+0.018 (DiXi)
       (1.738)     (-0.461)     (0.222)     (0.427)
R
2 =0.002     F = 1.470
The results indicate that there is no
statistically significant difference in the trend in
paddy yield between the turned-over and the
non-turned-over systems in West and Central
Java during the reference period.
Farmer Perceptions about Agricultural
Performance
To ascertain farmer perceptions about the impact
of management transfer on agricultural
performance, farmers in the four case study
systems were asked to compare paddy yields
after transfer with those obtained before
management transfer. Between 60 percent and 70
percent of farmers interviewed in the two systems
in Central Java reported an improvement in rice
crop yields in the second season after turnover.
In the two West Java systems between 70
percent and 80 percent of farmers reported no
change in yield before and after turnover.
12
12A study by Bruns, Kurnia, and Tajidan (1994) also found most farmers reporting no impact. However, it found that the changes for
those farmers reporting changes were substantial enough to suggest significant impacts on yields.
Financial and Economic Impacts
Cost of Irrigation to Farmers
With the transfer of the management of public
irrigation systems from the government to farmers,
the latter were expected to mobilize their own
resources to meet the cost of O&M of the
systems. It is hypothesized that irrigation
management transfer increases the cost of23
FIGURE 6a.
Trend in paddy yields in non-turned-over systems, 1991–1996.
FIGURE 6B.
Trend in paddy yields in turned-over systems, 1991–1996.24
prices of paddy.  To account for locational
variation in farm gate prices, output was valued in
terms of the national average price of paddy as
the standard.  Prices were adjusted for domestic
inflation over the period 1991–96 on the basis of
the wholesale price index for Indonesia (1995=100)
and the gross value of output was calculated in
terms of constant 1996 US dollar value.
Figures 8a and 8b illustrate the trend in the
GVO/ha in the non-transferred and transferred
systems, respectively in West and Central Java.
The regression model illustrated in equation 1
(p.15) was fitted with GVO per hectare as the
dependent variable and the same explanatory
variables as in the equation to determine whether
there is a significant difference in the trend in
GVO per hectare between the two categories of
systems.
The following parameter estimates (with
t-statistic within parentheses) were obtained:
GVO/ha(US$/ha)=
          2456.37+248.83 DI +6.40 Xi- 8.989(DiXi)
    (19.515)   (1.542)   ( 0.198)     (-0.217)
R2 =0.04     F. statistic = 9.14
The results indicate that there is no
statistically significant difference (at the 5%
level) in the trend in the gross returns per
hectare of paddy between the turned-over and
non-turned-over systems during the period
1991–96.
Data on water supply were inadequate to
compare the productivity of irrigation water
between the two groups of systems. Instead,
the analysis was confined to comparing the
returns per unit of water diverted before and
after turnover in Cinangka II and
Cimpanumbangan systems in West Java. Data
on water issues in these systems were
obtained from the records maintained by the
local irrigation agency. Figure 9 illustrates the
gross returns per unit of water diverted in the
two systems before and after transfer. In
Cinangka II, there has been a steady increase
irrigation to farmers.  In small-scale irrigation
systems in Indonesia, water charges paid to the
village or WUAs are normally paid in kind (paddy)
rather than in cash.  In the four systems studied it
was found that the associations’ records of fees
collected and expenditures made were often not
complete (which itself is probably an indication of
the weakness in financial management).
Therefore, the impact of management transfer on
the cost of irrigation to farmers was assessed in
terms of results of a questionnaire survey
conducted in the four systems selected for the
study. A sample of farmers from the systems
was interviewed about their perception of
changes in the costs related to irrigation before
and after turnover. The results of the survey are
illustrated in figure 7. The proportion of farmers
reporting no change in the amount of water fees
paid in kind were 45 percent in Kaliduren,
65 percent in Planditan, 38 percent in
Cipanumbangan and 85 percent in Cinangka II
(figure 7). In Planditan and Cipanumbangan
35 percent and 60 percent, respectively, reported
an increase in the fee after turnover. In Kaliduren
about 55 percent reported a decrease in the fee.
Generally, farmers did not express concern about
the reported increases or decreases being
worrisome or too dramatic. In Planditan and
Kaliduren the village irrigation officer, not the
WUA, administers the fees.
Economic Impacts
This section analyzes the impact of management
transfer on the gross returns per unit of land and
per unit of water, measured in terms of the annual
gross value of output (GVO) per hectare and per
cubic meter of water diverted. The GVO per
hectare was estimated from data obtained for the
period 1991–96 from the sample of 35 turned-over
and 36 non-turned-over systems in West and
Central Java selected for the study.
For the small-scale systems in this study,
GVO is a function of crop yields and farm gate25
FIGURE 7.
Farmer perceptions about changes in the cost of irrigation.26
in the returns per unit of water diverted during
the period 1986-1990. It had recorded a drop
in 1992 the year of transfer and had shown an
increasing trend since then. In the
association generally lacks the legal and political
clout to mobilize loans and enter into contracts
that would permit group involvement in agri-
business and agro-industry ventures. Furthermore,
it was typical to find in the small-scale irrigation
systems in Indonesia that, even before turnover,
farmers were already heavily involved in
performing a variety of managerial functions,
such as channel desilting and cleaning and
organizing water rotations in the dry season.
However, these functions are often carried out
within the context of a cyclical relationship of
codependency (farmers rely on government
subsidy and, the agency “relies” on deterioration
to justify rehabilitation projects). The farmers
handle tasks for immediate or seasonal needs
while deferring preventive maintenance and
letting the government eventually deal with the
high cost of rehabilitation. Correspondingly, the
agency seeks to attract external funds, which
are justified by the deteriorated condition of
irrigation systems. Hence, for many small-scale
systems, turnover does not constitute a
dramatic change in management. The main
change is the reduction of government subsidies
for maintenance, and possibly, the removal of
some or all agency staff from the system. There
may be a shift in terms of the agency/farmer
relationship but the basic codependent
relationship is still in place.
There are reasons why the turnover process,
as implemented, may have served more to
reinforce dependency of farmers on the
government rather than to engender self-reliance.
Generally, the WUAs were not formally organized
Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions
In the small-scale irrigation systems in West and
Central Java examined in this study, prior to and
after turnover, water and land resources were
already being intensively exploited. Cropping
intensities are relatively high and water is
generally recycled and reutilized between systems
along river courses. The potential for  improving
productivity or profitability of irrigated  agriculture
through changes in irrigation system management
is, therefore, relatively limited, and this is a key
reason for the lack of substantial improvement in
agricultural productivity after turnover.
We have seen that, in Indonesia, irrigation
management turnover is not a uniform
phenomenon. In practice, it may or may not
include replacement of agency staff with local
people hired by the WUA, transfer of control over
the intake or main canal, and full financial
responsibility for future rehabilitation and
modernization. Reportedly, WUAs were not given
extensive training or empowerment. The
Indonesian small-scale turnover program involves
only a limited degree of devolution of authority.
The WUA has the mandate to operate and
maintain the irrigation system from the intake, or
main canal, to the drains. But it does not have a
formal water right and does not own the irrigation
infrastructure (although this may change later).
In general, the WUA is virtually powerless to
settle disputes and enforce collection of irrigation
service fees in irrigation systems, which cut
across multiple villages, the norm in Java and
other densely populated areas. Also, the
Cipanumbangan system, there has not
been an appreciable difference in the
returns per unit of water before and after
turnover.27
FIGURE 8a.
Gross value of output per hectare in non-turned-over systems.
FIGURE 8b.
Gross value of output per hectare in the turned-over systems.28
until after the design and construction of pre-
turnover repairs were underway or completed.
Nominal inputs are obtained from a few “farmer
representatives” about priorities for repairs and
improvements and their preferred design. Typically,
the large majority of farmers are not involved in
planning the physical improvements. The
government paid farmers for their labor and
generally no local investment was required.
Uncertainty remains about whether, or under what
terms and conditions, the government may
subsidize future rehabilitation or modernization of
small-scale irrigation systems.
Farmers in Indonesia have grown accustomed
to nearly four decades of nonparticipatory
government-sponsored assistance to small-scale
irrigation. It is a dubious proposition that the
Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover Program, as
conceived and implemented, can, by itself,
reverse the dependent and speculative attitudes of
farmers about their irrigation systems.
In summary, the following factors mitigate
against the Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover
Program having a substantial impact on irrigation
system management or the performance of
irrigated agriculture:
 limited amount of authority devolved
 weak position of WUAs
 extensive farmer role in codependent
management prior to turnover
 current environmental limits to major advances
in the performance of irrigated agriculture
 effects of program implementation on reinforcing
dependency of farmers on the government
It is against this backdrop that the findings of
this study on the five hypotheses about impacts
of management turnover are to be understood.
The first hypothesis is that turnover will induce
changes in system management practices that will
improve management efficiency and
FIGURE 9.
Gross value of output per unit of water diverted (US$/m
3).29
responsiveness to farmers. This study indicates
that some measures were adopted after turnover
by the new WUAs to improve the efficiency of
management (improved water distribution
arrangements) and to make ditch tenders and
association officers more responsive to farmers’
concerns. The majority of farmers interviewed
reported an improvement in management
efficiency and responsiveness after turnover or a
satisfaction before and after turnover. This was
particularly the case in Kaliduren. Only a very few
reported that things had worsened after turnover.
The second hypothesis is that turnover will
result in a significant improvement in the quality of
O&M of the infrastructure. As with management
efficiency and responsiveness, for operational
performance, most farmers interviewed reported
either an improvement in water distribution
adequacy and fairness or satisfaction before and
after turnover. Only a very few reported a decline
in performance after turnover. The most striking
aspect of operational performance was the report
by a large majority of farmers in all four systems
that water distribution conflicts had decreased.
The inspection of the canal network showed the
existence of a moderate amount of disrepair and
indicated that farmers are substantially under-
investing in the long-term maintenance of
infrastructure.
The third hypothesis is that turnover will
increase the cost of irrigation to farmers. The
study indicates that farmers report no significant
change in the cost of irrigation to them.
The fourth hypothesis is that turnover will be
followed by improvements in agricultural
productivity levels. An analysis of the sample of
irrigation systems in West and Central Java
shows no significant difference in the irrigation
intensity and crop yields between systems that
have and have not been turned over to WUAs.
The fifth hypothesis is that turnover will be
followed by a discernible improvement in the
economic productivity of irrigated agriculture.
The evidence shows there is no statistically
significant difference in the gross value of
output per hectare of irrigated agriculture
between systems that have or have not been
transferred to farmer management. The results
also show that in the two case-study systems
(Cinangka II and Cipanumbangan), there is no
appreciable difference in the returns per cubic
meter of water diverted before and after
turnover.
In brief, we conclude that the Small-Scale
Irrigation Turnover Program has led to modest
efforts by farmers to improve management
efficiency and responsiveness and most
farmers report either an improvement or a
continuing positive situation. Turnover has
brought about a modest reduction in
government expenditure on small-scale
irrigation systems. There has not been a
general increase in costs of irrigation to
farmers, at least, in the short run. Regarding
water distribution, the situation in the four case
study systems tended to either improve or
remain positive after turnover. However, it is
apparent that requirements for significant future
expenditures loom ahead unless the current
observed underinvestment in maintenance by
farmers is halted. No significant changes were
observed in agricultural or economic
productivity related to turnover.
Recommendations
The following recommendations arise on the
basis of the findings of this study and evidence
from other studies on the irrigation
management reforms in Indonesia.  We believe
that these recommendations are generic in
nature and are relevant to many countries
besides Indonesia. Similar recommendations
have been made for management turnover or
transfer programs elsewhere (see Arriëns et
al.1996; Merrey 1996; Vermillion and Garcés-
Restrepo 1998; World Bank 1993). We
recognize that policy recommendations
necessarily involve tradeoffs over values and30
 4. To more effectively obtain the support of the
majority of farmers for the WUA and to
empower farmers to have a more influential
role in rehabilitation, it is advisable to fully
organize the WUA and obtain binding
agreements among farmers regarding
establishment of the WUA and implementation
of turnover before physical improvements are
made.
13 In order to develop the WUA’s
capacity to invest and enter into contracts,
physical improvements prior to turnover should
be made in response to WUA’s requests for
assistance and with known terms and
conditions, which require local investment, in
labor, local materials or funds.
5. It appears that the use of agency staff as
institutional organizers is rather ineffective.
Aside from the problem of lack of experience
and skills in organizing farmers, agency staff
often perceives the turnover program as a
possible threat to their jobs or the clout of the
agency. Reports indicate that members of the
agency staff tend to focus on design and
construction and are generally ill-prepared to
engage in institutional development activities.
We suggest that consideration be given to the
low-cost approach used in the Philippines of
selecting, training and utilizing articulate and
locally-respected farmers as institutional
organizers, not as a substitute but as a
supplement to agency staff inputs (see
Wijayaratna and Vermillion 1994; Raby 1997).
6. To reduce or eliminate farmer underinvestment
in maintenance and dependence on
government subsidies, a clear policy about
future responsibility for rehabilitation and
modernization needs to be adopted and
communicated consistently to farmers. If the
government adopts a policy to provide
subsidies for rehabilitation and modernization,
1. It is apparent that WUAs need to be granted
clear water rights in order to be effective in
managing their water, inspiring confidence in
their members and staking claims against
competing water users along a water basin.
Also, WUAs need to have clear authority to
repair, redesign or modernize irrigation
infrastructure within their areas of
jurisdiction. This may be seen as a prelude
to a complete transfer of irrigation systems
including the ownership of assets.
2. Inasmuch as irrigation systems in densely
populated areas of Java increasingly serve
water uses other than agriculture, we
recommend that research and policy
analysis be done to determine whether it is
advisable for other kinds of users to also
be eligible to become members of WUAs.
Excluding alternative water users from
also bearing the cost of water will only
weaken support for the WUA among
irrigators.
13This is the approach that has been followed, historically, by the US Bureau of Reclamation in organizing irrigation districts in the
American west. See Svendsen and Vermillion 1994.
other political considerations relative to which
the authors’ expertise may not be relevant.
Rather than making absolute
recommendations, we propose that these
ideas be given consideration by decision
makers.
3. Currently, the WUAs have no formal
representational linkage with the district or
provincial government irrigation committees or
the new water basin management authorities.
Since governments are typically ineffective  in
regulating water without the participation of
local users, we suggest that consideration be
given to providing a more substantial forum for
WUAs to interact with the government and the
larger set of water users from other sectors.31
and if the government policy is to stimulate
local investment, then it may be advisable to
create eligibility requirements whereby WUAs
can qualify for future government assistance.
Such requirements could include:
 proportional matching investment
by the WUA
 developing a long-term capital
replacement fund by the association
 implementing approved maintenance
practices by the association, perhaps to
be certified by the irrigation agency or
other thid party
7. Implicit in recommendations 5 and 6 is the
notion that irrigation service agencies at the
province and district levels need to reorient
their basic roles from control and
implementation for irrigation management to
support and regulation, and from irrigation
O&M to joint-management and regulation of
water basins. Such changes in mandates
will require organizational restructuring
including  changes in staff deployment,
skills needed, new forms of financing (based
more onpayments for services delivered
than central  or provincial government
allocations), and new incentive systems to
motivate the agency towards a service-
delivery orientation.32
Planditan system is located in the Purworejo
district, Central Java. It serves 68 hectares of
farmland located in four villages (see table 1).
Soils are dark brown and reddish latosols and
alluvials, located on a relatively flat terrain with an
elevation of 120 meters.
The water supply is obtained by diverting
water from the upper reaches of the Klopo river by
a weir with a gated intake and an open channel
canal system. The weir and main canal were built
in 1918 during the Dutch occupation. The main
canal is 4.4 kilometers long and has 17 field
channel offtakes along it, each of which serves an
average field-channel area of about 3 hectares.
In this highly fragmented farmland 92 percent
of farm parcel sizes are less than 0.14 hectare
each. There are 404 farmers cultivating land in the
system, of which 96 percent are owner operators.
The average annual farm income from these
smallholdings is approximately US$130 to
$155 per year. Farmers normally cultivate two rice
crops per year, and a third between November/
December and August/September. Farms are
generally left fallow between late September and
early November.
During periods of water abundance, water is
distributed by continuous flow throughout the
system. During periods of water shortage,
normally during the second and third seasons,
water is rotated between blocks. Main, secondary,
and field channels are cleaned of weeds and
partially desilted prior to land preparation for each
season. This is done by farmers without pay and
is arranged by the WUA or the village
governments. These procedures were not changed
after management turnover.
During the turnover process, the WUA was legally
established and its officers and ditch tenders were
provided short-term training. Some repairs were
made to the main canal system but farmers were
not involved in decision making or investment in
the repairs. The government discontinued
expenditures for the system and, in October 1992,
removed one member of the staff from the system
after turnover. Another member remained after
turnover and had partial responsibility for
managing the intake and main canal. The number
of government staff declined from two to one.
Kaliduren System
Kaliduren system is located in the Purworejo
district of Central Java. Its service area is
190 hectares, which cuts across five villages. The
main crop is paddy, with a small amount of
nonseasonal rice grown sometimes if there is a
third season. Soils are dark brown to reddish
latosols and alluvials on a generally flat
topography. The elevation is 152 meters.
The system diverts water from the upper
reaches of the Kodil river, using a weir and open
channels for water distribution. The weir and main
canal were built in 1918. The main canal is
6,942 meters long but the total length of
distributary channels is only 300 meters. The
system has 3 branch canals and 29 field channel
offtakes. Each field offtake has a sliding sluice
gate and a discharge-measuring device. The
average field chanel block (or tertiary block) area
is 5.75 hectares.
The system has 1,090 farm parcles, most of
which are highly fragmented, with an overall
average size of 0.07 to 0.17 hectare per parcel.
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Of the farm parcels 80 percent is less than
0.07 hectare in size. Fifty-two percent of the
farmers are owner operators, 14 percent are
renters or sharecroppers and 34 percent have
received land by allocation from the village for
their service in the village administration. The
average annual farm income from these parcels
was in the range of only $130 to $155 in 1995.
The system has three potential seasons per
year. The main rainy season is from October/
November through February/March. The second
season is from March/April through July/August.
In some years, there may be a short third season
between August/September and October/
November. Paddy is virtually the sole crop during
the rainy season and the dominant second-season
crop. Groundnuts tend to be the main crop if there
is a third season.
During periods of water abundance, water is
distributed by continuous flow throughout the
system. During periods of water shortage in the
second season, water is rotated between blocks.
Often during the third season, when water is
especially scarce, it is delivered on a first-request
basis. Routine maintenance is arranged by the
WUA or the village governments and implemented
with non-paid farmer labor, as in Planditan. These
procedures were not changed after management
turnover.
As part of the turnover process, the WUA was
established and made legally valid. Since the
system traverses six villages (each of which had
a WUA before turnover), a WUA federation was
established at the system level. However, village-
level WUAs asserted their continuing superior
authority over the federation and the federation
WUA has been weak until the present. WUA
officers and staff were given training.
Paradoxically, the agency actually increased its
staff assigned to the system from two to four after
turnover, to improve O&M of the intake and the
main canal. After turnover, the “federated” WUA
took over the management of the intake and the
main canal from the West Java Irrigation Service.
Village-level associations took over the
management of branch canals or distributary
channels.
Cipanumbangan System
The Cipanumbangan system is located in the
Panumbangan village in the Sukabumi district,
West Java. It irrigates 150 hectares. The average
farm parcel size is 0.38 hectare. Main soil types
are red and yellow latosol, podsolic and alluvial,
located in a hilly terrain, which experiences
frequent landslides and soil erosion.
The water supply is diverted with a river
diversion weir into open channels. The weir was
built in 1970. The main canal is 6,000 meters long
and has seven field-channel offtakes along its
length, each of which has adjustable sluice gates
but no measuring devices. The total distributary
canal length is only 500 meters.
There are 101 farm operators in the system.
Fifty-two percent are owner operators,
33.5 percent are renters or sharecroppers, and
14 percent have received use rights from the
village. Farm parcels are slightly larger in
Cipanumbangan compared to the systems in
Central Java. Tenancy is also more common.
Farmers plant two or three paddy crops per
year, with some non-rice seasonal crops grown
during the dry season between August and
October.
Water distribution along the main canal and
field channels is by continuous flow to the field
level when supply equals or exceeds demand.
Water is rotated along the main canal during
periods of pronounced scarcity. The main canal
and field channels are cleaned prior to the start of
each cultivation season. This is organized by the
WUA and is implemented with unpaid farmer labor.
These procedures did not change with
management turnover.
During the turnover process, the main canal
and intake were repaired but without farmer34
participation in either decision making or
investment in the repairs. A WUA was legally
established and nominal training was given to
farmers. One member of the agency staff was
removed from the system while one remained.
After turnover, in June 1990, a new system of
rotational distribution was initiated by the WUA at
subsystem levels to facilitate planting of more
non-rice seasonal crops during the dry season.
After turnover, operation of the main canal was
taken over by the WUA but the intake was still
controlled by the agency. The local in-kind water
fee (which was to pay for farmer-level
management activities before turnover) was
5 kilograms of unhulled rice per hectare per
season between 1985 and 1992. After turnover,
the fee was raised to 7.5 kilograms of unhulled
rice (paddy) per ha per season.
Cinangka II System
The Cinangka II system is located in the
Kuningan district, West Java. It has a service
area of 430 hectares and receives water from a
river diversion weir and a free intake (with a
pumping station). In 1980, the government built
the current weir. The network has 6 distributary
channels and 18 field-channel offtakes. Water
discharge is only measured at the intake. The
system has fertile latosol and podsolic soils on a
flat to undulating terrain.
There are 1,217 farmers in the system,
80 percent of whom are owner operators.
Sixteen percent farm on a leasehold basis. The
average size of a farm parcel is 0.2–0.35 hectare.
The system normally has two to three cropping
seasons per year. Paddy is grown two or three
times. Non-rice crops (especially soybean) are
sometimes grown in the third season, between
August and October. During each season, when
water is abundant, it is distributed by continuous
flow and, when it is in short supply, it is
distributed by rotation (at main-canal or
distributary and field-channel levels). After
turnover, these procedures did not change and
both the intake and main canal continued to be
under the control of the agency.
In Cinangka II, the same basic turnover
process was implemented as in the other
systems. This included physical repair of the main
canal system, with limited participation by farmers
and village leaders and some mobilized group
labor for intake and canal repairs. The number of
members of the agency staff was reduced from
five to one, and this number was retained to
operate the large intake. In meetings at the village
level, farmers elected village-level WUA officials,
who, in turn, elected overall WUA leaders at the
federated level. The WUA was legally established
and limited classroom training was provided to its
officials. Turnover occurred in June 1990. However,
as was the case in Kaliduren, the WUA federation
at the system level has been in a weak position
relative to its constituent village-level associations.35
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